Add Hermes web dashboard at hermes.apps.williamturner.eu

Enabled via HERMES_DASHBOARD=1 (supervised in-container alongside the
gateway, per docs/user-guide/docker.md), bound to 0.0.0.0:9119 so Traefik
can reach it. Two independent auth layers, not one:

1. Traefik basicauth middleware in front of the whole route.
2. Hermes's own basic-auth gate (mandatory once the bind is non-loopback).

Hermes's docs explicitly call basic-auth-alone "not suitable for direct
public-internet exposure" and cite a real June 2026 incident where
internet scanners reached exposed dashboards and drove agents into
planting SSH-key backdoors — hence the extra Traefik-level gate rather
than relying on Hermes's own login page alone.

Also fixes: the htpasswd hash for Traefik's basicauth needs its literal
'$' characters escaped as '2824147' in .env, or docker compose's own variable
interpolation corrupts it (mistook '' for further
 references). Also switched the hash from Python's default SHA-512
crypt ('$...') to apr1 ('$...', via openssl passwd -apr1) —
Traefik's basicauth middleware doesn't accept SHA-512-crypt.

Also re-adds Hermes's OPENAI_BASE_URL/OPENAI_API_KEY routing through the
local litellm gateway (instead of OPENROUTER_API_KEY direct) — this was
part of the now-abandoned PR #12 and never actually landed on main.

.env.example

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 # --- domain / TLS ---
 MATRIX_SERVER_NAME=matrix.apps.williamturner.eu
 AGENT_HOSTNAME=agent.apps.williamturner.eu
+HERMES_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME=hermes.apps.williamturner.eu
 # Set to true ONLY for the first-boot window while creating the bot account,
 # then back to false (or unset) and redeploy. See README.
 MATRIX_ALLOW_REGISTRATION=false
@@ -37,6 +38,18 @@ HERMES_MATRIX_ACCESS_TOKEN=
 # (internal network only, not published anywhere).
 HERMES_API_SERVER_KEY=
 
+# --- hermes web dashboard (hermes.apps.williamturner.eu) ---
+# Two independent auth layers: Hermes's own login (basic auth — its docs call this
+# "not suitable for direct public-internet exposure" alone) plus a Traefik-level basic
+# auth gate in front of it. Both required, different credentials recommended.
+HERMES_DASHBOARD_USERNAME=william
+HERMES_DASHBOARD_PASSWORD=
+# 32+ random bytes — `openssl rand -base64 32`
+HERMES_DASHBOARD_SECRET=
+# htpasswd-format "user:hash" for Traefik's basicauth middleware. Generate with:
+#   python3 -c "import crypt; print('someuser:' + crypt.crypt('somepassword', crypt.mksalt(crypt.METHOD_SHA512)))"
+TRAEFIK_HERMES_AUTH_HASH=
+
 # --- portainer (GitOps redeploy) ---
 PORTAINER_STACK_WEBHOOK_URL=
 

docker-compose.yml

@@ -77,13 +77,28 @@ services:
       # rooms (DMs to it would respond unprompted, per Hermes's own default behavior).
       MATRIX_ALLOWED_USERS: ${MATRIX_HUMAN_USER_ID}
       MATRIX_REQUIRE_MENTION: "true"
-      OPENROUTER_API_KEY: ${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}
+      # Routed through the local litellm gateway, not OpenRouter directly — one place to
+      # hold the OpenRouter credential and swap models. Does NOT grant Hermes access to
+      # the Claude subscription (Anthropic-side restriction, proven earlier — the
+      # subscription only works through the real `claude` CLI binary, which Hermes isn't).
+      OPENAI_BASE_URL: http://litellm:4000/v1
+      OPENAI_API_KEY: ${LITELLM_MASTER_KEY}
       # Left disabled: Hermes itself warns that a network-reachable API server combined
       # with the default unsandboxed ('local') terminal backend gives any caller full
       # terminal/file access within the container. Matrix is the actual interface in use;
       # re-enable (API_SERVER_HOST: 0.0.0.0) only alongside terminal.backend: docker if
       # claude-agent ever needs to call Hermes programmatically.
       API_SERVER_ENABLED: "false"
+      # Web dashboard, supervised in-container alongside the gateway (same process group,
+      # same s6 tree) — see docs/user-guide/docker.md "Running the dashboard". Binds
+      # 0.0.0.0 so Traefik (a separate container) can reach it; that makes Hermes's own
+      # auth gate mandatory, which it enforces automatically once the bind isn't loopback.
+      HERMES_DASHBOARD: "1"
+      HERMES_DASHBOARD_HOST: 0.0.0.0
+      HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORT: "9119"
+      HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_USERNAME: ${HERMES_DASHBOARD_USERNAME}
+      HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD: ${HERMES_DASHBOARD_PASSWORD}
+      HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_SECRET: ${HERMES_DASHBOARD_SECRET}
     volumes:
       - /home/william/hermes-data:/opt/data
     networks:
@@ -92,6 +107,20 @@ services:
     # immediately exits ("Input is not a terminal") since a detached container has no
     # stdin — the container then just sits there having done nothing, every restart.
     command: ["gateway", "run"]
+    labels:
+      - "traefik.enable=true"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.hermes-dashboard.rule=Host(`${HERMES_DASHBOARD_HOSTNAME}`)"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.hermes-dashboard.entrypoints=websecure"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.hermes-dashboard.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt"
+      # Second, independent auth layer in front of Hermes's own login page — its docs
+      # explicitly call basic-auth-only "not suitable for direct public-internet
+      # exposure" and cite a real June 2026 incident where scanners reached exposed
+      # dashboards and drove agents into planting SSH-key backdoors. This means an
+      # attacker has to clear Traefik's gate before ever reaching Hermes's own auth,
+      # not just guess one password.
+      - "traefik.http.routers.hermes-dashboard.middlewares=hermes-dashboard-auth"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.hermes-dashboard-auth.basicauth.users=${TRAEFIK_HERMES_AUTH_HASH}"
+      - "traefik.http.services.hermes-dashboard.loadbalancer.server.port=9119"
 
   claude-agent:
     # Gitea PR-review only now — no Matrix presence (see hermes above; only one agent